Connected Isolation: North Korea's "Missing" Digital Revolution

Written by ME!!!

Communication networks are not just about phone calls or internet access, they are the nervous system of a modern economy. From logistics to research, education to finance, nearly every productive sector depends on the flow of data. In our western world, this reality was experienced and best understood during the so called "Third Industrial Revolution", when we saw an explosion in productivity driven by the integration of telecommunications, computing, and early networking technologies from around the 1970s. Yet North Korea remains an outlier and an exception in this global story. Despite some internal developments, it has largely bypassed the digital transformation that redefined economic landscapes elsewhere. This article explores the current state of North Korea’s communication and network systems, the constraints on their development, and how this might have impacted economic potential, framed in the context of how digital infrastructure had shown to have fueled growth in the West.

North Korea's Communication Systems: An overview

North Korea’s communications infrastructure has developed unevenly, with some progress in domestic telecommunications but little to no integration with global networks. Since 2008, the country has operated a 3G mobile network, Koryolink (고려링크), created through a joint venture with the Egyptian company Orascom. This network now serves millions of users, particularly in urban centres such as Pyongyang. However, its functionality is severely restricted: it permits only domestic text and voice messaging, with no access to international communication or mobile internet. As such, it operates less as a tool for economic or social advancement and more as a state-sanctioned means of internal coordination and surveillance.

To replace internet access, the North Korean government operates a closed national intranet known as Kwangmyong (광명). This "air-gapped" digital environment hosts a limited selection of state-approved websites, encyclopedias, scientific literature, and internal communication portals. It is intended to simulate the functionality of the global internet while preventing the population from encountering unfiltered information. Access to Kwangmyong is generally restricted to select universities, research institutions, and government bodies. There is no provision for engaging with global databases, collaborative platforms, or external research archives, effectively cutting North Korean institutions off from the international scientific and technological community.

In contrast to its internal isolation, the state has invested heavily in cyber capabilities for offensive purposes. Elite units such as the Lazarus Group have conducted sophisticated cyber-espionage and financial theft operations, including many high-profile attacks on financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. This creates a sharp juxtaposition between the regime’s digital prowess in cyberwarfare and its intentional underdevelopment of domestic digital access. While the government possesses highly trained personnel with access to global networks and advanced cyber tools, the broader population and economy remain largely disconnected. This duality underscores the regime’s prioritisation of state power over developmental or economic utility in its approach to communication infrastructure.

The Economic Impact - Stalled Growth

The service sectors in Western economies (particularly banking, insurance, and retail) experienced significant gains due to advances in telecommunications and computing. These sectors increasingly relied on automated transaction systems, digital records, and customer relationship management tools, all of which enhanced service delivery and reduced operational costs. Most transformative of all was the commercialisation of the internet, which catalysed the birth of entirely new industries such as e-commerce, software development, and digital media. Together, these developments reduced transaction costs, improved supply chain visibility, enabled remote collaboration, and allowed economies to scale more rapidly and efficiently.

North Korea’s failure to adopt comparable digital infrastructure has resulted in a range of economic limitations. One of the most significant is its persistently low total factor productivity. State-run factories and enterprises often rely on outdated machinery and manual reporting processes, lacking the real-time data and feedback mechanisms that drive continuous improvement in modern production environments. As a result, inefficiencies remain unaddressed, and innovation is stifled.

Additionally, the absence of real-time communication networks and integrated logistics systems has created significant bottlenecks in economic coordination. Without reliable digital communication, scaling operations across regions or industries is cumbersome, requiring physical documentation, in-person supervision, and redundant layers of bureaucracy. This not only slows productivity but also increases the likelihood of errors and resource misallocation.

Moreover, North Korea’s digital isolation severely restricts its potential to participate in global export markets. Modern supply chains depend on shared digital platforms for quality assurance, traceability, and financial transactions. The lack of internet access, secure communication protocols, and modern accounting systems makes it nearly impossible for North Korean enterprises to integrate with international partners or meet the transparency and compliance standards required for foreign trade and investment. Consequently, the country remains excluded from the economic opportunities that digital infrastructure has enabled elsewhere.

Improvements? Possible, or Fantastical?

While comprehensive digital liberalisation in North Korea remains improbable under current political conditions, there are still viable, economically compatible pathways for selective modernisation of communication and network infrastructure. These approaches do not necessarily conflict with the regime’s core interests and could offer substantial economic benefits if framed around internal efficiency and national development rather than openness to foreign influence.

One such strategy involves the deployment of localised enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems across state-owned enterprises. Even within a closed intranet environment, implementing basic digital systems for inventory tracking, maintenance scheduling, and workforce management could lead to measurable improvements in productivity and operational coherence. These systems need not be connected to the global internet to deliver benefits; similar implementations in Western factories during the 1980s and 1990s provided significant efficiency gains by digitising data flows and integrating decision-making processes. A North Korean variant of ERP could function within the bounds of the national intranet, offering a controlled yet effective form of industrial digitisation.

Another promising area lies in the enhancement of technical and vocational education, particularly in the fields of software development, data management, and network administration. North Korea already boasts a relatively strong scientific education tradition, especially in mathematics and engineering. Expanding this foundation to include practical ICT training could prepare a new generation of digitally literate workers, capable of maintaining internal networks, developing domestic software applications, and contributing to the efficiency of government and industry. Even if internet access remains restricted, a skilled technical workforce would strengthen the country's internal systems and lay the groundwork for future economic flexibility.

Lastly, the regime could experiment with controlled digital integration in designated economic zones. Special administrative regions such as Rason could serve as pilot sites for limited internet access, digital payment systems, and networked logistics, particularly in the context of trade and light manufacturing. This approach mirrors China’s initial use of Special Economic Zones in the 1980s, where digital infrastructure was introduced gradually under strict regulatory oversight. Such an initiative could attract foreign partners under managed conditions, while providing the regime with insights into the economic utility of digital systems without threatening ideological control.

Conclusion, the Digital Ghost of "What Could Be"

North Korea today stands as a rare example of a nation that has largely bypassed the digital transformations which have reshaped the global economy over the past five decades. While much of the world has reaped the economic benefits of communication networks, digital infrastructure, and internet connectivity, North Korea has maintained a posture of intentional isolation. Its communication systems are engineered not to foster growth, but to reinforce internal control and restrict external influence. This approach has severely limited the country's capacity for industrial modernisation, economic integration, and innovation.

The contrast with the historical experience of Western nations during the Third Industrial Revolution is particularly stark. In the West, communication infrastructure served as a catalyst for structural economic change, enabling more efficient production, faster information flow, and the emergence of entirely new industries. The resulting increase in productivity and economic complexity was central to the prosperity of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. North Korea’s failure to adopt even a fraction of these technologies has left it locked in an outdated economic model, where manual oversight and central planning continue to dominate in the absence of real-time data and digital coordination.

Nonetheless, history suggests that economic imperatives can, over time, lead to shifts in state policy. The potential for selective digital development exists, especially in areas that align with regime priorities such as industrial efficiency, education, and administrative control. Carefully implemented reforms—ranging from internal ERP systems to digitised public services—could deliver tangible economic benefits without necessarily undermining the political status quo. Moreover, by focusing on pilot programmes within controlled environments like special economic zones, the regime could experiment with limited openness in ways that are manageable and reversible.

Ultimately, North Korea's path forward in the digital age may depend less on the availability of technology and more on a shift in strategic priorities. If economic resilience and competitiveness begin to outweigh the perceived risks of information openness, the country may gradually move toward a model where communication infrastructure is viewed not as a threat but as a national asset. Until such a reorientation occurs, however, the digital divide between North Korea and the rest of the world will remain one of the most enduring obstacles to its economic development.